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EXPLORATION OF TIME DELAY AND COST 
OVERRUN IN LIBYAN PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS 
Authors 
Institutional affiliation and institutional address 
There is great concern in Libya about the delays in public sector projects. Libyan 
construction projects habitually deviate from estimated timelines and financial 
profiles. Such frequent failures impose a financial burden on the state and causes 
significant delays in the implementation of these essential public projects. Globally, 
there has been considerable debate on how to minimise risk factors that affect 
completion of such construction projects. Whilst literature specific to Libya reveals 
ineffective project management practices typify Libyan construction projects with 
extensive time and cost overrun not only accepted, but seen as routine practice.  As 
long ago as 2004 the Libyan government acknowledged that their contractors by and 
large provided a highly ineffective and inefficient service with little credence given to 
the need for effective risk management yet little action to address these failings 
subsequently followed.  Contributing to this body of work, the results from an 
exploratory qualitative survey based on a series of 16 semi-structured interviews 
undertaken with Libyan construction professionals are reported. The rich data 
emerging from the interview process provides a valuable insight into the specific 
nature of project risk and effectiveness of risk management techniques in Libya. 
Whilst the respondents emphasized their unfamiliarity with risk management, a 
myriad of project risks emerged from the interviews suggesting project overruns in 
Libya are a resultant effect of failings to initiate effective project management.  
Keywords: Delay, Cost Overrun, Libya, Risk Management. 
INTRODUCTION   
As Libya struggles to recover from the conflict in 2011 with two different governing 
powers, post-conflict recovery is massively dependent on accessing the 48.36bn 
barrels of oil held in vast oil reserves, the largest in Africa and amongst the largest in 
the world (OPEC 2015). To fully exploit these oil reserves, the Libyan GNC has 
instigated $140bn investment between 2016 and 2026 including the development of 
oil and civilian infrastructure including 500,000 new homes.  Critical to the success of 
these projects, is ensuring their timely completion within the agreed budget. However, 
with delay and financial overrun estimated to severally impact 69% of projects 
undertaken in Libya (Ghadar, 2017) understanding their cause and developing 
strategies to mitigate their impact on the project is essential to the successful 
acheviement of the NGC’s objectives.  Consequently, this research aimed to explore 
the underlying causes of delay and cost overrun within the Libyan construction 
industry.  Literature relating to time delay and cost overrun is reviewed. The results of 
an initial exploratory study collecting data from 16 construction professionals 
exploring the nature of project delay and cost overrun is presented. Finally, the paper 
concludes by proposing further research to validate the findings with a larger sample 
together a detailed review of Libyan contractual provisions related to project delay 
and cost overrun. 
  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
A project is considered successful when it is completed on time, within budget, in 
accordance with specifications (Aziz 2013). In practice, these three dimensions are 
strongly interdependent and correlated. The inability to achieve these objectives, 
typically manifest as delay and overrun (Adam et al 2017) with risk and thus the 
outcomes of risk events, overruns, becoming endemic in the construction industry. 
Several large multi-national studies, such as Flyvbjerg et al’s (2002) analysis of 258 
infrastructure projects which revealed they have an 86% probability of exceeding their 
budget estimate. Morris’ (1990) seminal work investigating overruns in India revealed 
65% of 290 projects experienced cost overruns. Together with Baloi and Price’s 
(2003) analysis of 1,778 World Bank funded projects revealed a sizable majority 
(63%) exceeded their initial budgets.  
The extant literature, appraising project overrun, continues to reaffirm the truly global 
perspective. Adam et al’s (2017) recent exhaustive review of the state of art revealed 
1,748 publications exploring the causes and effects of time delay and cost overrun. 
Despite revealing exponential growth in literature, little is revealed by way of 
consensus related to the dominant causes of delay or overrun.  Nevertheless, Adam et 
al’s (2017) analysis of the literature revealed eight root causes of delay and overrun, 
shown in table 1. Although it was acknowledged the significance of each cluster 
manifests differently once a temporal analysis of the literature is considered.    
Table 1: Hierarchy of Delay and Overrun causing factors (adapted from Adam et al (2017)’ 
Cause Instances Cause Instances 
Communication Lack of stakeholder communication, 
inefficient communication 
Material Shortage of equipment, poor 
material planning 
Management Poor site management, inadequate 
managerial skills, poor monitoring & 
control, slow decision making, client 
change, poor labour planning 
Organiza
tional 
Unsuitable management structure, 
poor organisational structure, poor 
process procedures 
Psychological Optimism bias, Deception Project Project complexity, project 
duration. 
Financial Delayed payments, poor financial 
planning, price fluctuation 
Weather Harsh weather conditions, 
Unforeseen ground conditions. 
Notwithstanding the comprehensive nature of the extant literature, Amadi and Higham 
(2017) raised concerns about bias evident in the geographical contextualisation of the 
research. Noting the majority of primary data is collected in developed rather than 
developing nations, where the potential challenges associated project delivery are 
more perspicuous.  Although studies focusing on developing nations are limited 
(Amadi & Higham 2017) those that have been undertaken reveal the eight clusters 
determined by Adam et al (2017) remain relevant. However, their prioritisation 
changes significantly with studies contextualised in developed nations advocating 
project related risks to be the most significant factor impacting on overrun. A situation 
not replicated in developing nations where corruption, client and consultant induced 
risk impacts significantly on project outcomes (Adeyemi & Masalila 2016). In 
furtherance of this argument Fang et al (2004) opine causes of delay and overrun are 
habitually unique to the nation of interest. Different social and economic systems in 
tandem with historical, religious and cultural backgrounds routinely influence 
construction methodology and project management practice. Consequently, the 
specific nature and propensity of risks identifiable within each of the fundamental 
  
clusters is likely to change. Thus, a clear distinction is needed between a cause and its 
explanation (Adam et al, 2017). Whereby explanations will often not be directly 
transferrable.  
Time Delay and Cost Overrun Risk in Libya 
In comparison to other developing nations, Libya has been focus of very limited 
research appraising the manifestation of risk within the project environment leading to 
project delay (Abubaker et al 2008, Elharare et al 2016, Ghadar 2017). Albeit Libya 
can be identified as one of the most impacted with delays of 69% not uncommon.  
From the extant literature, it can be said that failings in project management, poor 
client understanding and performance are largely associated with the extensive delays 
and overruns identified. Whilst Abubaker et al (2008) is at pains to argue that project 
delay is both complex and multifaceted. There is, almost universal agreement within 
the literature that ineffective project management is the main contributor to delay.  
Elharare et al (2016) investigated the nature of project delay in Libya through analysis 
of survey responses gleaned from 300 construction professionals. Whilst the work 
suggested a combination of human, project and external factors induced delay, 
analysis revealed the client’s misguided perception that procurement could deliver 
both cost reductions and increased quality lay at the heart of delays. With ineffective 
project management compounding these failings. Principally due to the appointment 
of inexperienced and un-qualified project managers (Assaff & Al-Hejji 2006, Tumi et 
al 2009, Abujnah 2010, Ghadar 2017).  An interpretation contested by Abubaker et al 
(2008) and Ghadar (2017) instead espouse project managers are experienced but 
unfamiliar with modern construction methodologies and advances in project 
management due to a lack of training and international experience. These failings are 
further compounded by clients slow, ineffective decision making and poor payment 
practices (Tumi et al 2009, Ali & Arun 2012). Leading to further time and cost 
overrun as projects are abandoned until payments are received (Tumi et al 2009, 
Abujnah 2010, Mohamed 2010) or instigate lengthy legal disputes (Assaff & Al-Hejji 
2006) 
Even with robust arguments suggesting poor project management and client failings 
remain at the core of poor project outcomes. El-Hasia (2005) narrated that Libyan 
national procurement policy sits at the core of project failure. With policy often 
identified as vague and unsupportive of modern procurement. Ghadamsi (2016) 
contested the imposition of a top down procurement policy resulted in a one size fits 
all approach. Whereby 92% of projects adopt traditional design-bid-build 
accompanied by the Libyan standard form of contract regardless of suitability. This 
alongside a disregard for contractor selection (Elsayah 2016) and imposition of un-
realistic timescales suggests projects are doomed to fail before they have begun. 
Yet the challenges Libya presents as it struggles to recover from the conflict in 2011 with 
major security issues, a deregulated market, vulnerable legal framework and lack of 
central governing power has led to major shortages of skilled labour, materials and 
equipment (Shebob et al 2012). Triggering extended periods of delay whilst materials 
are sourced, labour recruited and extensive re-work undertaken. Even though the 
impact of wider contractor-oriented delay on cost and time does not dominate the 
literature, a small number of studies narrate similar assertions. Tumi et al (2009) 
observed endemic materials shortages on projects clustered around Benghazi City. 
Similarly, Abujnah (2010) suggests contractor induced delay makes a significant 
  
contribution to project overrun. With materials shortages, lack of experience and 
challenges of sourcing skilled labour negatively impacting on project delivery.  
Extant literature is already replete with factors that engender cost and time overruns. 
International literature advocates risk related to project overrun can be hierarchically 
categorised using eight themes: management, financial, communication, materials, 
organisational, project, psychological and weather.  However, Libyan literature does 
not replicate these assertions.  Albeit the Libyan literature, due to the dominance of 
quantitative design, fails to satisfactorily explore the root causes of project failure. The 
work nevertheless presents a far narrower perspective of the causes of project delay 
and cost overrun.  It must be acknowledged the number of studies looking at time 
delay and financial overrun are limited, with an exhaustive review literature 
identifying only 26 studies, 10 of which are doctoral thesis.  Furthermore, the majority 
are over 10 years old.  For the most part this body of work fails to reflect the 
significant changes following the first Libyan Civil War. Aziz (2013) exploration of 
post-conflict Egypt emphasises the importance of exploring how conflict and regime 
change impacts on the root cause of project delay.  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
As narrated earlier, the majority of Libyan research focused on risk associated with 
project overrun routinely adopts a realist, post-positivist design, using large scale 
surveys to gather rigidly framed opinion data from random samples of construction 
professionals (Tumi et al 2009). Providing a national perspective of the risks leading 
to delay and cost overrun. Rather than considering specific nuances identifiable within 
individual projects (Fang et al 2004, Adam et al 2017). Survey designs are influenced 
by the most common causes of delay or cost overrun identified in the literature.  Thus 
introducing bias by limiting the response options available.  The need to ascertain the 
nature of delay and cost overrun within the context of a project without the constraints 
seen as a major limitation within extant literature called for the adoption of a 
qualitative research design.  Through which delay and overrun could be 
comprehensively explored. Consequently, a phenomenological approach, making use 
of an inductive research strategy (Creswell 2015) was adopted to explore key themes, 
understandings and attitudes of those who work within the project environment on a 
daily basis (Flick 2009).  
Data Collection and Analysis 
The research presents the findings of detailed interviews with a range of construction 
professionals, drawn from 23 public housing projects, executed by 15 different 
contractors in the Libyan cities of Subrata and Surman. Galvin (2015) espouses 
interviews sample sizes of between 8 and 17 reflect the norm for qualitative research. 
It was therefore resolved to adopt a discriminate sample of 16 participants (see table 
2).  Creswell (2015) advocates discriminate sampling as a way to maximise the 
opportunity of relevant data collection from a small sample.  
Participants were invited to take part in a semi-structured interview, as this ensured 
the interviewee has sufficient space to offer new meanings to the research focus by 
drawing on the nuances of their individually constructed experiences (Denscombe 
2014) held at their office and lasting approximately 45 minutes. The interviews sought 
to establish key thematic areas from which a broader research agenda can be 
established. To aid the interviews, the questions focused on an initial analysis of 
project delay and cost overrun to allow different actors to reflect on the triggers of the 
  
established delay. The interviews were recorded with the consent of participants, fully 
transcribed and loaded into Nvivo qualitative analysis software before being 
thematically analysed. Open coding was used to identify sub-categories associated 
with the central themes outlined above. Once a large number of nodes were identified, 
axial coding revealed relationships between nodes and sub-nodes. As the analysis 
continued, each category was developed to reflect the content of the data collected and 
draw out more detailed categories. In developing this process, the data was repeatedly 
analysed.  
Table 2: Research Participants 
 Exp. 
(Years) 
Stakeholder 
Group 
 Exp. 
(Years) 
Stakeholder 
Group 
 Exp. 
(Years) 
Stakeholder 
Group 
R1 20 Consultant R7 23 Contractor R13 30 Client 
R2 27 Consultant R8 21 Contractor R14 16 Client 
R3 26 Consultant R9 20 Contractor R15 20 Client 
R4 19 Consultant R10 12 Contractor R16 21 Client 
R5 24 Contractor R11 22 Contractor    
R6 26 Contractor R12 18 Contractor    
FINDINGS 
Familiarity with Management of Risk 
The majority of professionals (15) portrayed a limited understanding of risk 
management, or indeed other approaches to the management of risk, though none used 
these specific terms.  The approach in Libya was effectively captured by a consultant 
who suggested the management of uncertainty is typically based on lessons learnt: 
“the common strategy used by all construction practitioners is to deal with risk 
management only by personal decisions based on previous experience rather than 
using proactive management approaches based on evaluating and assessing risk” 
(R2).  Indeed only one of the consultants expressed a familiarity with any form of risk 
management.  Further admitting risk management is far from general practice in 
Libya: “To a large extent, dealing with the principles and rules of construction risk 
management in Libyan construction field is very limited” (R2). 
Due to this lack of familiarity with risk management is was therefore resolved to 
explore how this translated into the management of construction projects, with a focus 
on how risk is considered and explored within their own organisations. Although all 
16 interviewees agreed there was no formal approach whereby risks would be 
considered and systematically identified. It was apparent that some limited risk 
management did occur.  Albeit this approach, as the consultants interviewed 
suggested, would typically involve allowing a contingency, as a single percentage, to 
allow for potential overrun.  Suggesting a largely reactive approach to risk 
management whereby risk would be addressed when discovered with hope the 
contingency is sufficient: “Dealing with risks just when they arise is the most common 
way used by owners and contractors to manage and control risks” (R1), 
Looking at how this approach to risk management impacts on construction projects, 
the interviewees where asked to reflect on the performance data provided based on the 
analysis of the 23 projects under review, this resulted in some rather surprising 
responses that suggested delays and overruns where both common place and expected: 
  
“the majority of public sector housing projects have exceeded their scheduled time 
and cost by different percentages” (R2) a view reinforced by respondent 16 who 
confirmed: “this is not exceptional the majority of public housing projects show 
significant delay and cost overruns” (R16).  
Factors contributing to delay and overrun 
Management Risk 
Management represented the most significant cause of the delay with 10 risks events 
identified by participants. The most significant related to frequent post contract 
change with clients failing to have: “a clear view concerning the targeted design and 
specifications of the project, therefore change orders where frequently issued during 
the construction phase” (R1). An observation reinforced by a number of contractors 
who suggested levels of post contract change diminished their ability to appropriately 
plan the project. Whilst the interviewees accept a small number of changes are often 
necessary to resolve unexpected design issues.  It was contested the vast majority of 
change related to: “the specification of materials [that] where unnecessary and could 
be avoided” (R2) as they should have been resolved during the design phase.  
Impact of change represented the second most significant cause of overrun, with 11 
respondents identifying delays in decision making as major triggers of unnecessary 
and avoidable delay. It was suggested “clients respond slowly to any queries or 
requests submitted either by contractors or consultants. Resulting in delays in project 
progress and in some circumstances complete stoppage of the work on site” as a 
result: “continuity of work was controlled by the clients response time not the 
programme developed” (R10).  When asked about the frequency of this situation, one 
contractor simply responded: “they are very frequent” (R5) but also contradicted the 
views put forward by consultants, suggesting they were equally indecisive.  
Despite post-contract management failings dominating, a number of avoidable pre-
contract problems were also identified as triggers for delay. For instance it was 
suggested clients employ: “unqualified decision makers in [their] senior management 
[who] were taking decisions at the top of the clients organisation that normally led to 
undesirable situations” (R4). When pressed on the nature of these undesirable 
situations respondent 13 suggested: “unqualified decision markers push through 
crucial decisions without asking related departments to prepare detailed studies that 
would enable them to make appropriate decisions” (R13).  
This approach to decision making, it was suggested, occurred throughout the project. 
With impulsive decision-making identified as a fundamental risk by consultants: 
“rash behaviour by the owners’ senior management in taking important decisions led 
to massive delays in project progress” (R10). Yet it remains unclear how this 
correlates with slow decision-making identified earlier. Although its impacts are clear, 
with one client suggesting this: “would often necessitate successive change orders” 
(R15) thus triggering significant periods of delay. Furthermore, it was suggested this 
approach often resulted in unclear specifications, a lack of detailed ground 
investigations, incomplete drawings and poor project planning information. 
Financial Risk 
The interviews revealed a number of financial factors that led to project delay and cost 
overrun, although these seemed to differ between project and wider economic factors.  
Whilst there was consensus that poor project management by clients, resulted in poor 
financial planning: “the volume of contracts signed each year for public housing 
projects is much larger than the available budget” (R4). This in turn would led to 
  
poor payment practices, with contractors encountering: “considerable delay by the 
owner in payment for performed work” (R6) impacting: “company cash flow and 
result in slow work progress at the site” (R6).  However, one contractor also 
confirmed: “frequent delays in decision making increased the cost burden on the 
contractor due to the wages paid to labour during the work stoppage” (R8). 
Material Risk 
A number of interviewees identifying high variances in materials prices throughout 
the contract period: “the prices of materials where not fixed and faced a noticeable 
variations up and down during the contract” (R9). Or at worse the unavailability of 
essential materials: “due to increasing demand for construction materials . . .there 
was a shortage in the availability of materials in the local market” (R5). This situation 
gave rise to material and equipment theft from site: “theft of materials and equipment 
from the site happened several times during the previous years and caused stoppage 
of the work at the site many time as well” (R8). Whilst respondent 3 suggested: “due 
to the lack of security, project materials were stolen from the site from time to 
time”(R8) as a result the contractor would: “import materials in limited quantities to 
the site, resulting in additional time and cost” (R3). 
Political Risk 
Although political risk was not as apparent at the start of the project, two Libyan civil 
wars have introduced a significant amount of risk to the project. These risks emerged 
as some of the most significant in terms of frequency of identification.  The first, 
however, pre-dates the wars, relating to robust legislative control of procurement and 
the recruitment of labour, or more specifically the barriers to recruiting skilled labour 
internationally. Respondent 10 suggested: there was difficulty in bringing in technical 
labour from abroad, due to complex government regulations” (R10).  A point 
reinforced by participant 3, who suggested if these procedures had been eased the 
project could have been delivered more efficiently as the: “international workforce 
exhibited the essential skills needed that are severely lacking in Libya” (R3). This 
problem is compounded by the lack of skilled labour available due to the: “significant 
under-supply of labour caused by massive increases in project delivery” (R14).  
Unsurprisingly the majority of respondents alluded to the joint impact of post-conflict 
political instability and security failings as contributing to the delay and cost overruns 
encountered.  “Since 2011 up to November 20 2016 there is no political stability in the 
Libyan state” (R1). A perspective reinforced by respondent 5 who observed: “the 
changes in government over the last 6 years affected the political stability of the state” 
(R5).  When asked how this instability translated into project risk, Respondent 4 
suggested it resulted in time being wasted: “waiting for documents and approvals 
from political government agencies, with political instability also affecting project 
funding and frequent changes of decision makers at senior levels further delaying the 
project” (R4). However, this lack of political stability also translated into an insecure 
work environment, further impacting on both labour recruitment and site security. 
Procurement Risk 
The majority of those interviewed identified procurement processes and legislation 
underpinning the process of public sector procurement as a major risk contributing to 
project overrun.  The first factor identified, which is intrinsically linked to the 
financial risk, related to the over-procurement of public projects, as a result of poor 
client management and understanding of the procurement process.  The participants 
  
identified the procurement process itself to be highly flawed, with projects put to the 
market with incomplete and inaccurate information.  
It also become clear that the problems experienced during the construction phase 
where exacerbated by poor tendering practices. Six interviewees identified the lack of 
contractor vetting as a major risk. Suggesting this resulted in inexperienced 
contractors being awarded contracts. Resulting in a situation whereby: “some 
construction companies involved in this project where established recently and have 
no experience” (R4).  Giving rise to: “poor performance during the construction stage 
resulting in massive delays in project delivery” (R2).   
It was suggested this failure to pre-qualify contractors also brought about financial 
challenges, as contractors where not always capable of sustaining the cash flow 
needed to deliver the project. Respondent 4 acknowledged: “the weakness of the 
financial state of some companies involved in this project made those companies 
incapable of accommodating payment delay” (R4). Whilst a government 
representative revealed this lack of financial robustness had: “affected the continuity 
of the work progress in terms of company’s poor cash flow preventing them employing 
different package contractors to work concurrently” 
DISCUSSION  
Risk and its translation into project failure through time and cost overrun has 
continued to present a fertile ground for research in the extant literature, however, 
literature exploring overrun in a Libyan context remains limited, in part due to the 
dominance of the adoption of large-scale quantitative surveys that seldom offer any 
deeper reflection from the participants on the context of risk, why these risk events 
occurred or how indeed they could be effectively managed. The Libyan literature 
espoused the dominance of three fundamental root causes: Management failure, 
overly perspective, top down procurement policy and wider economic impacts 
associated with post-conflict instability. Whilst not reaching any firm conclusions, the 
findings from the study suggest a significant disparity between previous quantitative 
studies undertaken in Libya and experiences of practitioners.  
Whilst findings of this research reaffirm the significance of these factors, the 
interviews revealed an array of additional root causes for delay and overrun. Whilst 
also revealing risk is Libya is far more complex and interlinked that the extent 
literature suggested. Indeed, analysis of the qualitative data reveals the root causes of 
delay synthesised in Adam et al’s (2017) review of extant literature, shown in table 1, 
are closely replicated in the Libyan context. Clearly contradicting Amadi and 
Higham’s (2017) assertion that an extensive volume of the extant literature, 
contextualised within developing nations, fails to reflect the situation in developing 
nations. It can also be argued the findings only partially support Fang et al’s (2004) 
suggestion that country specific research is required to capture specific nuances of 
project delay. Although this does allow interpretation is it clear the eight root causes 
emerging from the extant literature are of universal relevance.  
Given the majority of projects are highly impacted by delay and overrun, those 
interviewed accepted risk is poorly reactively managed and is often introduced 
through easily fixed failings in project management (PM). The study reaffirms the 
earlier view that PM failings are often at the core of delays. Moreover, the study 
reaffirms the argument that unqualified project managers are often engaged to oversee 
projects. (Assaff & Al-Hejji 2006, Tumi et al 2009, Abujnah 2010, Ghadar 2017).  
  
However, unlike previous studies, the participants revealed failings in PM are not 
occurring within the professional team employed to deliver the project but are 
embedded at a senior level within client organisations. Leading to irrational, 
ineffective and slow decision making, reinforcing the assertions made by Tumi et al 
(2009) and Ali & Arun (2012).  The findings further revealed those same senior 
professionals where also the primary decision maker for the client. Despite lacking 
expertise, they routinely failed to seek technical advice from consultants before 
providing instruction to the contractor. Resulting in legal disputes and extensive 
claims confirming the observations of Assaff & Al-Hejji (2006).  
Despite the Libyan construction industry feeling the impact of on-going conflicts the 
situation observed by Aziz (2013) in post-conflict Egypt, is only partially replicated 
here. Although conflict has impacted on project and undoubtedly increased the 
propensity of delay, as a result of labour and material shortages, challenges to security 
and uncertainty in the funding of major projects. The majority of those interviewed 
did not feel the situation, in terms of ineffective project delivery had changed 
significantly due to the conflict. 
CONCLUSIONS  
The findings from this research raise questions about the Libyan construction 
industry’s ability to reduce cost and time overrun successfully. The research findings 
suggest that whilst cost overrun and project delay are highly complex and multi-
faceted construct. The professionals interviewed identified a number of key barriers to 
reducing and overcome project failure including: ineffective strategic management 
within the client organisation reinforced with inefficient management at project level, 
the complexity of state legislation that prevents the recruitment of international 
construction experts and also much needed site labour, the impact of the on-going 
conflict on project delivery due to security failings and uncertainty in the political 
environment and highly ineffective procurement processes and contractor vetting.  
Whilst the findings in Libya have not mapped against the emergent view of risk 
categorisation presented in the international literature, they have also dismissed the 
current three factor perspective argued in the limited Libyan literature providing for 
the first time, a phenomological perspective on the complexity of project delay and 
overrun.  However, it also become clear that a large majority of the identified project 
risks could be mitigated should Libyan professionals enhance their understanding of 
risk management and make a paradigm shift in practice from a reactive to a proactive 
approach to risk identification, evaluation and mitigation. The findings of this study 
are replete with manageable and ultimately avoidable risk that could significantly 
reduce project cost overrun and delay. 
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